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Introduction
The traditional policy dilemma in the design of welfare systems is to balance the
desire to raise the living standards of low-income households with that of encou-
raging self-sufficiency through the promotion of work incentives, and reducing
government expenditure. One policy which aims to overcome this dilemma is an
in-work transfer programme.
In-work benefits, or earned income tax credits, are typically motivated as a method
of alleviating poverty that does not create adverse work incentives and may create
positive incentives. They do this by targeting low-income families with an income
supplement that is contingent on work. Typically, eligibility is based on family
income and requires the presence of children, reflecting in part the higher (out-of-
work) welfare benefits for families with children and partly their higher costs of
working (childcare). Consequently these benefits are most heavily targeted toward
single parents and low income couples with children. Increasingly, they are also
being proposed for low-income workers with or without children.1 However, family
income based eligibility rules and the interaction with other aspects of the tax and
∗ We are grateful to the Inland Revenue and the ESRC Centre for the Microeconomic Analysis of Fiscal Policy at the
Institute for Fiscal Studies for financial support; to colleagues at the IFS for their intellectual generosity; and to Yu
Zhu and Michal Myck for help with the analysis. The views expressed are the responsibility of the authors alone.
1 See the proposed Employment Tax Credit, HM Treasury (2000).
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benefit system make the analysis of the impact on work incentives and the impact
on overall income distribution more complex than they may first appear.
In-work benefits have a long history in both the UK and the US. In the UK, Family
Income Supplement (FIS), which provided an earnings supplement for those fami-
lies with at least one full-time worker, was introduced in 1971. Like FIS in the UK,
the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) in the US was also introduced in the 1970s
as a way of introducing a negative income tax for low income working families.
However, the two systems operated rather differently. The differences are impor-
tant for understanding the different impact that the reforms have had on work
incentives and the distribution of income. For example, FIS had a full time work
requirement with a 50% benefit reduction (or phase-out) rate whereas the EITC
provided a tax credit supplement to all earnings, with a phase-in until a maximum
credit or maximum income limit was reached, then a low phase-out rate.
In the 1970s and early 1980s the lowest deciles of the income distribution in the
UK were occupied by the retired. This changed dramatically in the mid 1980s with
growing numbers of families of working age, and especially single parents, taking
over the lower deciles of the income distribution. In the US, with the falling real
wages of the low educated over the 1980s, and the increasing level of welfare
dependency among certain demographic groups, the EITC took on a new role
in welfare policy as a mechanism for encouraging work by supplementing the
working wage for low wage workers. In-work benefits consequently began to gain
in significance in the policy reform debate and were central to the tax and benefit
reforms in both countries in the mid to late 1980’s.
The UK benefit system was extensively changed in the 1988 tax and benefit reform.
The changing composition of low income households and the decreasing labour
market attachment of certain family types re-focussed the policy debate onto the
implicit tax on income faced by such low income families from the combined tax
and benefit systems. For example, by the mid-eighties the combined effect of the
50% FIS benefit reduction rate together with the impact of Housing Benefit (HB),
tax and National Insurance contributions (NICs) in the UK resulted in implicit tax
rates in excess of 100% for many workers. The 1988 reforms replaced FIS with
Family Credit (FC) and significantly changed the structure of housing benefit (HB)
and Income Support (IS). As we describe further below, Family Credit (FC) was an
extended version of FIS with a benefit reduction rate increased to 70%. Despite the
higher benefit reduction rate in FC and in HB, the reformed system treated each
benefit sequentially and considered the tax and benefit systems together so that
the implicit tax rates in excess of 100% that characterised the earlier system were
eliminated.
The eligibility rules for Family Credit in 1988 still required full time work, defi-
ned as at least 24 hours per week for singles and couples. Unlike the EITC in the
US there was no phase-in range. This was clearly a tough hurdle for many lone
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parents with young children and in April 1992 the in-work benefit system in the
UK was again reformed so that entitlement required at least one parent working
at least 16 hours per week. This reform increased the generosity of the system by
providing eligibility to the full credit for those working 16 hours or more. It provi-
ded a significant supplement to earnings for eligible low-income families. As we
document below there is strong evidence that this reform increased participation
among single women with children, especially those with lower educational qua-
lifications. However, it also reduced overall hours of work among eligible families.
The lowering of hours worked in recipient families was clearly a motivation for
the 1995 reform to FC which added a supplement to those taking full time work,
defined as those whose hours were in excess of 30 hours per week.
In the USA, Earned Income Tax Credit was expanded in 1987, 1993 and 1996,
and a modest version of EITC was introduced for childless couples from 1994.
Seven states have introduced supplementary (to the federal EITC) in-work transfer
programmes either following the Clinton reforms of 1996, or under earlier wai-
vers of the older AFDC rules. In Canada, Workers Income Supplement (WIS) was
introduced in 1993 and then abolished in a major reform in 1998, but the Self
Sufficiency Program (SSP), an experimental programme in British Columbia and
New Brunswick, has been running since 1992. These reforms have been the focus
of a number of ex-post evaluation studies that we discuss briefly below.
Reforms to FIS and Family Credit in the UK provide some basis for ex-post eva-
luation of in-work benefit reform in the UK. As will become clear in the discussion
below it is important to emphasise that in-work benefits are just a part of the
welfare and tax system. As highlighted in the recent studies by Ellwood (1998)
and Blank, Card and Robins (1999), only a partial view of the underlying financial
incentives created by in-work benefit reforms is revealed by analysing them in
isolation. This turns out to be especially so in the UK where, since the introduction
of Family Credit, in-work benefits have, unlike the case for EITC, been counted as
income in the computation of other welfare benefits. In particular, the interaction
with IS and council tax credit (formerly HB) is crucial in understanding the overall
impact of any reform in the UK.
The ability of in-work benefits to shift income towards low-income families and
to influence working decisions was already recognised in the Family Credit system
but became a major focus of the UK reform of 1999 where FC was replaced by
WFTC. Once WFTC was fully implemented in April 2000 it significantly increased
the generosity of FC through its extensive childcare credit and the reduction in
the benefit reduction rate to 55%. Although the take-up of FC increased over that
achieved by FIS, it fell short of the 80% levels achieved by EITC in the US. The
reform also acknowledged the potential importance of take-up by administering
the credit, as in the case of the US EITC, through the tax system rather than the
welfare system.
e´conomiepublique
79
dossier Richard Blundell, Ian Walker
It is clear from this brief history that the policy debate has largely been about work
incentives. However, there are clear theoretical reasons for suspecting that in-work
transfers have wider effects. Thus, an evaluation of WFTC ought to consider not
only the effects on labour supply via its effects on net incomes, but also its effects
on gross incomes that arises because the reform has general equilibrium effects –
in particular, it affects the demand side as well as the supply side of the market.
Moreover, since WFTC is both a wage and a childcare cost subsidy programme we
ought to be concerned with its effects on childcare use and childcare costs.
A further focus of this paper is to broaden the debate away from simple work incen-
tive issues to embrace wider questions that are raised by WFTC – including ques-
tions associated with the change in the default payee. These wider effects include :
intra-household distributional effects (and their consequences for labour market
behaviour); the relationship between child outcomes and parental resources; the
incentives to take-up the programme; inter-temporal incentive effects; and the in-
centives to parent and to partner.
Thus, here we aim to go beyond the narrow concerns of evaluating the move from
FC to WFTC to see what can be learned that may improve the operation of WFTC
in the future.
The remainder of this review is concerned with elaborating on these questions and
bringing together what we do know about the issues raised above. The penulti-
mate section considers the data that we have available for evaluation and what
can be done with it. In each section we highlight the important issues for future
research and the prospects for prosecuting such research with the data available.
The conclusion re-states what we do not (yet) know – but should.
1. TheWFTC Reform and
Questions for Research
The WFTC is illustrated in Figure 1 together with FC. WFTC has larger entitlements
than FC; the taper in the phase-out range falls from 70% under FC to 55% under
WFTC; and WFTC’s childcare credit replaces FC’s less generous childcare disregard.
WFTC is paid to either partner at the agreement of both partner. Exceptionally, if
a couple cannot agree who should receive the payment, then WFTC will be paid
to the partner who mainly cares for the child(ren). In contrast, FC was, by default,
paid to the mother who could veto payment to the partner.
It is worth emphasising that in-work benefits are just one part of the welfare and
tax system and should not be analysed in isolation. As highlighted in section 3,
the interaction between in-work benefits and housing benefit in the UK is crucial
in understanding the overall impact of any reform. Similarly the overall impact of
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any reform will depend on the interactions with other benefits and taxes as well as
other concurrent reforms. For example, in the UK the introduction of the minimum
wage and changes to National Insurance contributions are both likely to have an
impact.2
Figure 1 : The UK WFTC Reform
The distinctive features of WFTC are that : it is more generous than FC especially
at higher levels of income, it provides a much larger subsidy for childcare than
FC; and it is more transparent than FC. For all three reasons it is likely to have
larger take-up. Moreover, there is a potential reduction in stigma from paying via
tax system and through payment being automatic via employers.
Traditionally the impact of welfare programmes on work incentives have been
considered within a static context. However, dynamic issues are likely to be crucial
for the long-term effects of such programmes : time limited welfare is likely to
have very different dynamic incentive effects than unlimited programmes; non-
convexities in the relationship between current incomes and current entitlements
give rise to incentives for intertemporal substitution to capitalise of the programme.
The important questions for research are :
• To what extent does WFTC promote work incentives ?
• How effectively does WFTC promote redistribution and child welfare ?
• To what extent does WFTC affect other aspects of decision making : the incentives
to use childcare, to partner, to parent, and to declare income and hours (take-up,
avoidance and fraud) ?
• To what extent is WFTC likely to affect dynamic incentives – such as the incentive
to invest in “wage progression” either through the incentive to take a job with
2 Gregg, Johnson and Reed (1999) emphasise this point.
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a steep earnings profile, or to invest in human capital through pre-work formal
education or through on-the-job training ?
• A further important issue is the “general equilibrium” effects of WFTC on wages
and childcare prices – that is, to what extent does this wage and childcare subsidy
affect the gross wages and prices in these markets ?
These issues help shape the questions on the detailed design issues such as :
• What are the effects of the entitlement level (determined by the maximum and
additions for children) and the extent to which it is targeted (i.e. the magnitude
of the “phase-out” taper) ?
• Does the design of WFTC promote take-up ?
• How does an hours “notch” (16 hours in the case of WFTC) compare to a “phase-
in” range over which some (negative) taper applies (as in EITC) ?
Finally, a number of administrative questions also require careful consideration :
• What are the effects of a cash payment via a tax credit (as in WFTC) ?
• How does the nature and period of assessment and the timing of payments for
WFTC affect outcomes compared to different options such as “receive-as-you-
earn” or payment at the end of the tax year (as in EITC) ?
• Are there advantages in WFTC interacting with other transfer programmes (in
the UK HB is computed after WFTC so it counts WFTC income in determining
HB entitlements and hence overall incentive effects) whereas in the US EITC is
not counted for the purpose of computing other welfare entitlements ?
2. The Distributional Impact of theWFTC
2.1. Existing research
The distributional effects between households of replacing FC by WFTC are explo-
red in Giles, Johnson and McCrae (1997), using FRS data, and the results can be
summarised in Figure 2 drawn from that paper. The figure confirms the analysis in
HM Treasury (2000) that WFTC is relatively effective at targeting resources at lo-
wer deciles (with the obvious exception of the lowest where workerless households
are heavily concentrated).
While existing work depicts the simulated effects it typically does so under the
presumption of no changes in behaviour. This is singularly inappropriate for eva-
luating a mechanism designed to change labour market and take-up behaviour.
While there are a wide variety of possible behavioural effects, the most imme-
diate are the effects on labour supply and on take-up. WFTC is clearly designed
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Figure 2 : Effects of WFTC on Household Net Incomes
to change both and these changes will have second round effects on the effects
on net incomes that will need to be taken into account. Thus, the robustness of
the existing work will need to be tested by evaluating the distributional effects
under different assumptions about takeup rates and labour supply effects.3 Mo-
reover, this existing distributional work will need to be replicated on new data, as
it becomes available, and the effects should be compared with the possible effects
of alternative policies.
2.2. Consumption Smoothing
The existing work is based on analysing the effects on net incomes and this analysis
should be supplemented by work based on consumption. This would allow the
analysis to reflect the effects of the strategies that welfare recipients might use to
smooth their living standards in the face of fluctuations in their net incomes. The
Family Expenditure Surveys (FES) are the natural vehicle for such analysis since
it contains expenditures. Panel data is, however, desirable for analysing the long
term, as opposed to the short, effects and research work using new datasets could
usefully supplement existing work.
Apart from smoothing issues there are wider intertemporal effects that need to
be incorporated : the wage progression and human capital incentives alluded to
above and explained in more detail in a subsequent section.
3 See Paull et al (2000) for similar work for child support reform.
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2.3. Intra-household issues
Under WFTC rules, the recipient has to be agreed on application but it is antici-
pated that it will be paid mainly to the household earner through the pay-packet,
while, in the past, FC has been paid to the mother either directly to an account,
through an order book (of vouchers that can be cashed at a Post Office), or as a
girocheque. Thus, there is an important question about the distributional effects
within households. There is little evidence available that allows us to predict the
effects of such a potential transfer of resources from the “purse to the wallet”.
The late 1970’s UK child benefit reform was a “wallet to purse” transfer and this
has been shown to have increased the share of children’s and mother’s clothing in
household expenditures (see Lundberg, Pollak and Wales (1995)).
Moreover, while we have extensive evidence on the effect of growing up in po-
verty on long term outcomes for children we have almost no evidence that child
welfare and child outcomes are improved by giving poor parents greater financial
resources. The earlier US evidence that is available suggests, at best, that giving
the poor more money has only a weak effect on child “quality” (see Currie (1995)).
However the existing work in this area4 says little about the effects of policies that
individuals are likely to be on for some time, such as FC/WFTC. Thus, there is much
to be learned that will have importance for other policies aimed at promoting child
welfare.
2.4. Issues for research
Thus, two important areas of WFTC research will be :
• To extend what we already know about inter-household distributional effects to
account for the intra-household redistribution implied by WFTC.
• To attempt to uncover the impact of the higher parental incomes implied by
WFTC on (at least some) child outcomes of interest.
A corollary of these intra-household concerns is that labour supply decisions of
households are NOT made in a way which is consistent with the idea that household
members “pool” their resources when making decisions. This has ramifications for
the effects of WFTC on the behaviour of married couples : the effect of the reform
will depend on what happens to the distribution of resources within the household
4 See Shae (1997) and Duflo (1999). The agency problems that arise when attempting to improve child welfare by
increasing the net incomes of their parents may suggest that direct intervention that circumvents the parents may
be appropriate. There have been a number of attempts to do precisely this. Currie (1995) gives extensive details of
US programmes and Bingley and Walker (1999) analyses the effects of the UK free school meal, daycare milk and
welfare milk programmes that aim to improve child nutrition. The UK SureStart programme is a variety of treatments
designed to either improve the parents ability to act as agents for their children or to improve child quality directly.
However, there has yet to be any evaluation of the programme.
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as well as the total resources5. Thus, a third question that will require attention
will be :
• To attempt to model the way in which household members behave in the labour
market if they do not “pool” their resources.
These are some of the most difficult questions that confront policy analysis in any
area of programme design so it is not surprising that there is a dearth of convincing
evidence on these issues. This seems likely to be due to the lack of informative
data. Data to address this set of issues would be informative if they featured some
“natural” variation in resources across household and across individuals within
households.
3. In-Work Benefits, Budget
Constraints andWork Incentives
In-work benefits are designed to counter the low potential wages and the high
implicit tax rates faced by those individuals on out-of-work welfare. The idea is
to modify the incentive structure so that a larger fraction of out-of-work welfare
recipients take jobs and leave out-of-work welfare. The programs, from around
the world, discussed here all share very similar characteristics and aims. They are
designed with slightly different labour markets and slightly different target groups
in mind, but nonetheless they have very strong similarities.
3.1. The Early UK Reforms
3.1.1. Family Income Supplement
Family Income Supplement (FIS) was introduced in 1971. It was a non-contributory
benefit payable to low-income families with children, provided the head of the
family was in full-time paid work (defined as 30 hours per week, or 24 if the
individual concerned was a single parent). Entitlement depended on the family’s
income falling below a certain limit. The amount payable was half the difference
between the family’s income and the relevant limit. The limits in 1983 were £85.50
per week for a one-child family with £9.50 for each subsequent child with a maxi-
mum payment of £22 per week.
In addition to receipt of FIS, entitlement to FIS automatically conferred a number
of ‘passport’ benefits that were also available to those on Supplementary Benefit
– the income assistance programme for those not in full time work, including free
5 See Chiappori (1988) and Apps and Rees (1999).
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school milk and meals, free prescriptions and dental treatment (see Dilnot, Kay
and Morris (1985), for further detail).
Although FIS clearly provided some financial incentive to work, the combined
effect of the 50% FIS benefit reduction rate together with the impact of HB, tax
and NICs in the UK resulted in implicit tax rates in excess of 100%. This is displayed
in Table 1(a) and (b).
Table 1(a) : Marginal “Tax” Rates and the 1986 Reform to Family Credit
1985 System 1995 System
IT 25 25
NIC 7 7
FIS/FC 50 48
HB 23 17
Total 105 97
Notes : Withdrawal rate (%) per additional £ of gross income. Source : Dilnot and Webb (1989)
Table 1(b) : The 1995 UK Tax and Benefit System
Old System : £ per week New System : £ per week
Wage 70.00 115.00 145.00 70.00 115.00 145.00
− Tax 1.07 14.57 23.57 1.07 14.57 23.57
− NI 4.90 10.35 13.05 4.90 10.35 13.05
+ FIS/FC 19.50 − − 29.23 10.99 −
+ CB 14.00 14.00 14.00 14.00 14.00 14.00
+ HB 19.89 10.36 − 6.01 1.33 −
Net Inc. 117.42 114.44 122.38 113.27 116.40 122.38
Notes : Married man with non-working wife, two children (5,10), rent £20 p.w. and £6 p.w. Source : Dilnot and Stark
(1989)
3.1.2. The Introduction of Family Credit
Introduced in 1988, Family Credit was an extension of FIS and shares many of the
central features of the EITC in the US. It was designed to provide support for low
wage families with children. An unusual feature of the Family Credit system is the
minimum weekly hours eligibility criterion. A family with children needs to have
one adult working 16 hours or more per week to qualify for FC. At its introduction
this was set at 24 hours but then reduced to 16 in April 1992 to encourage part-
time work by lone parents with young children. To partially offset any adverse
incentive effects for full time work, a further supplementary credit at 30 hours per
week was introduced in April 1995. These Family Credit reforms are interesting
in their own right, but we will be particularly interested in them as a basis for
evaluating the reliability of assessment of the impact of the WFTC proposals.
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In the FC system each eligible family was paid a credit up to a maximum amount
which depends on the number of children. There was also a smaller addition if
at least one parent worked 30 hours or more. Eligibility depended on family net
income being lower than some threshold (£79.00 per week in 1998-99). As incomes
rose the credit was withdrawn at a rate of 70%. In 1996 average payments were
around £57 a week and take-up rates stood at 69% of eligible individuals and 82%
of the potential expenditure.
3.1.3. The 16 hour reform to Family Credit
The 16-hour reform became effective in April 1992 and moved the hours eligibility
rule from 24 hours per week to 16 (see Dilnot and Duncan (1994) for a detailed
description of this reform). Figures 3(a) and (b) shows the impact on the budget
constraint of a typical eligible single parent and highlights the interaction of Family
Credit with other benefits and taxes. The reform was designed to make working
more financially attractive, but may have also encouraged full-time workers to
reduce their hours of work.
Table 2 : Proportion of Gainers from WFTC
Hours of Work (banded)
0 1-10 11-20 21-30 31-40 41+
Lone parents
No pre-school children . . 62.1% 74.0% 52.2% 51.1%
One or more pre-school children . . 75.0% 87.9% 61.5% 61.5%
All . . 65.2% 78.2% 53.8% 53.4%
Married, partner working
No pre-school children 30.6% 19.0% 10.2% 4.9% 3.6% 3.1%
One or more pre-school children 35.9% 12.7% 11.7% 5.3% 4.4% 4.1%
All 33.9% 16.2% 10.9% 5.0% 3.9% 3.4%
Married, partner not working
No pre-school children . . 38.6% 53.3% 36.7% 66.7%
One or more pre-school children . . 73.1% 80.0% 45.0% 33.3%
All . . 51.4% 60.0% 39.1% 61.9%
Source : TAXBEN, based on 1995-6 Family Resources Survey. Notes : Data are grouped according to observed hours
of work for all household members and conditioned on observed childcare expenditure patterns.
3.2. The WFTC
The replacement of FC, the WFTC, is substantially more generous and was phased
in from October 1999 to April 2000. It increased the generosity of in-work support
relative to the FC system in four ways : by enhancing the credit for younger chil-
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Figure 3 : The 1992 Hours Reform to FC and Other Taxes and Benefits
(a) Single Parent in 1991
Notes : Single parent, April 1991, earning £3.00 per hour.
(b) Single Parent 1992
Notes : Single parent, April 1992, earning £3.00 per hour
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dren; by increasing the threshold; by reducing the benefit reduction rate from 70%
to 55%; and by incorporating a new childcare credit of 70% of eligible childcare
costs up to a quite generous limit. Table 2 shows that the gainers are concentrated
in middle of the hours distribution for workerless households and at the bottom
of the hours distribution for women with working partners. That is, in the range
where the earlier FC system cuts out. It is this increased generosity in the middle
of the hours distribution that is one of the three important features of the FC to
WFTC reform.
The WFTC budget constraint of a single parent before and after the WFTC reform
is shown in Figures 4(a) and (b). Similarly, the before and after FC to WFTC impact
for a typical male worker in a couple is presented in Figures 5(a) and (b) respec-
tively. This highlights the second important feature of the reform : other benefits,
especially housing benefit (rent rebate), offset the effectiveness of the increased
generosity of WFTC.
The childcare tax credit component of WFTC could clearly have an important
further impact on labour supply behaviour. This credit increases the maximum
amount of WFTC by 70% of childcare costs up to a maximum of £100 per week
for those with one child or £150 per week for those with two or more children.
The childcare credit component is available to lone parents and couples where
both partners work more than 16 hours per week. The childcare tax credit compo-
nent could clearly have an important impact on labour supply behaviour – both
through increasing the incentive to participate and, through changing the balance
of desirability between part-time and full-time work.
The third important feature of the reform was the replacement of the small FC
childcare disregard by a 70% subsidy for childcare expenses (up to some, large,
limit). Table 3 provides the distribution of existing childcare usage form the Family
Resources Survey. The corresponding distribution of childcare costs for couples and
single parents, at different hours of work, is provided in Tables 4(a) and 4(b). This
makes it clear that the marginal cost of childcare rises with hours of work as
parents exhaust the cheaper forms of care first. Lone parents use relative/friends
care more intensively than married couples since the absence of a partner implies
that parental care (measured here as no care reported) is less available.
In simulating the WFTC reform6 this data is used to compute the potential childcare
costs of new labour market entrants assuming that they will “look like” existing
childcare costs for those currently in work. Since existing non-particiapnts may
not have access to childcare at such favourable terms as participants this may
considerably underestimate the take-up of the credit and underestimate its impact
on labour supply. New data for WFTC evaluation will have to be carefully designed
to capture any changes in costs and usage of childcare.
6 See Blundell, Duncan, McCrea and Meghir (1999).
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Figure 4(a) : Single Mother before WFTC
Notes : Single parent, April 1997, earning £3.50 per hour (2000 prices).
Figure 4(b) : Single Mother with WFTC
Notes : Single parent, April 2000, earning £3.50 per hour (2000 prices).
Finally, it is worth noting the combined effect of childcare credit and the WFTC on a
mother with a low paid employed partner respectively. The third important feature
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Figure 5(a) : Married Couple before WFTC
Figure 5(b) : Married Couple after WFTC
of the WFTC reform, more generous treatment of childcare, was illustrated in Figure
12 earlier and Figure 6 provides a typical budget constraint for a married women
with employed partner. Note that, at least if behaviour is driven by the simple
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Table 3 : Type of childcare usage where youngest child under 5
Type of Care Couples Lone parents All
No care reported 35.4% 9.3% 32.9%
Relatives only 28.7% 44.0% 30.1%
Relatives and friends combined 1.1% 4.4% 1.4%
Friends only 3.0% 9.8% 3.6%
Childminders only 11.2% 11.1% 11.2%
nursery care only 7.1% 6.7% 7.1%
Childminders & informal combined 2.5% 3.4% 2.6%
nursery care & informal combined 4.3% 7.5% 4.6%
multiple formal care 3.4% 1.0% 3.1%
other forms of care 3.3% 2.6% 3.3%
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Source : Family Resources Survey, 1994/5 and 1995/96
Table 4(a) : Weekly childcare expenditure by hours of mother and type of care –
couples
Type of Care Hours of Work (banded)
1-10 11-20 21-30 31-40 > 41 Total
Relatives only 1.25 2.50 6.20 13.41 15.26 7.00
Relatives and friends combined 15.00 5.17 9.39 25.82 . 13.06
friends only 5.91 14.78 14.50 32.91 23.33 17.43
childminders only 17.21 35.62 54.21 72.70 72.16 59.33
nursery care only 40.57 47.53 60.58 82.81 66.58 67.56
childminders & informal combined 15.33 29.05 41.41 53.85 55.00 41.36
nursery care & informal combined 12.81 27.96 30.80 48.09 46.87 34.10
Multiple formal care 34.61 49.30 67.18 100.90 88.36 70.23
other forms of care 35.00 64.69 83.27 124.19 119.69 108.85
Total 3.09 10.74 22.63 41.11 33.82 22.51
Source : Family Resources Survey, 1994/5 and 1995/96.
Note : Some cell sizes are too small for reliable figures to be produced
household model of labour supply, the reform suggests that secondary workers in
such households will be less likely to work under WFTC than under FC. However,
since receipt of childcare credit is conditional on both parents working at least 16
hours there incentive structure in Figure 6 could induce some partners to stay in
work or even enter employment to take advantage of the childcare credit.
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Table 4(b) : Weekly childcare expenditure by hours of mother and type of care –
lone parents
Type of Care Hours of Work (banded)
1-10 11-20 21-30 31-40 > 41 Total
relatives only 0.82 2.34 5.27 15.94 9.00 5.75
relatives and friends combined 3.33 6.33 18.00 50.00 . 16.94
friends only 6.09 7.86 15.42 30.45 0.00 14.46
childminders only . 36.87 42.33 65.13 110.23 61.66
nursery care only 15.75 9.67 48.03 64.53 66.50 48.39
childminders & informal combined . 34.13 13.67 55.60 48.00 40.38
nursery care & informal combined 8.67 8.57 18.45 60.52 0.00 30.37
multiple formal care . 48.00 . 69.92 . 64.44
other forms of care 0.00 42.50 71.00 57.50 138.00 60.85
Total 1.88 8.18 17.11 37.70 35.55 19.65
Source : Family Resources Survey, 1994/5 and 1995/96
Note : Some cell sizes are too small for reliable figures to be produced
Figure 6 : Budget constraint for example woman in couple – with childcare
Notes : Spouse working 40 hours at £5.87 per hour, 1 child aged under 11, Hourly wage £3.72 (25th percentile for
women in couples with children), Rent £41.10p.w. (median for social renters with children), Childcare at £1.96 per
hour
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4. QuantifyingWork Incentives
Abstracting from childcare considerations, the largest cash gains from WFTC go to
those people who are currently just at the end of the FC benefit reduction taper. It
follows that WFTC has little effect on income at low hours, and so we should expect
only modest effects on participation rates. But the lower WFTC taper implies that
the incentive to work full-time as opposed to part-time is improved under WFTC
so we should expect to see a shift in the composition of employment towards
full-time work.
In contrast, the position for mothers with low income spouses is that, because
WFTC (and FC before it) is means tested against benefit unit (i.e. the couples’)
income the secondary worker in the household faces higher income levels at low
hours relative to high hours and their incentive to both participate and to work
full-time as opposed to part-time is diminished. This detrimental effect on the
behaviour of married mothers was a feature of the empirical work by Eissa and
Hoynes (1998) where the EITC expansion between 1984 and 1996 was estimated
to have decreased participation by 1%+ for married mothers.
Although before-and-after comparisons are indicative of what might happen, they
do not provide sufficient information to simulate new reforms of this type. For that
to be the case a model that separates the effects of preferences from the effects of
constraints is required. Such a model is developed in Blundell, Duncan, McCrae
and Meghir (1999). This develops earlier work on structural simulation by Hoynes
(1996) and provides a similar framework to Bingley and Walker (1997) and Preston
and Walker (1999). In particular, it allows for childcare demands to vary with hours
worked. It also allows for fixed costs of work which are found to be important.
As we have seen, the WFTC reform is designed to influence the work incentives of
those with low potential returns to work in the labour market. It does this via the
increased generosity of in-work means-tested benefits. For single parents the WFTC
does unambiguously increase the incentive to work. For secondary workers in
couples, however, the incentives created by the WFTC lead to lower / participation
in the labour market – at least, if we adopt the model of labour supply which
assumes that couples pool their resources. There are also financial incentives to
participation for a male in a married couple where the partner does not work. For
such couples where neither parent is working the incentives are unambiguously to
move into work. Indeed the gains are far larger than for our lone parent example,
as the largest cash gains from the WFTC reform accrue to those at the end of
the current taper. The incentives to change hours of work are ambiguous. But
one interesting point is the marked increase in the effective marginal tax rate for
those who become eligible to WFTC as a result of the reform. This group face
an increase in their marginal tax rates from 33%, produced by income tax and
National Insurance, to just under 70%, produced by the interaction of the 55%
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WFTC taper on post-tax income. In the example the marginal tax rate rises from
33% to just under 70% above 40 hours of work.
There are a number of important conceptual problems with analysing labour supply
effects that need to be addressed.
Firstly, WFTC raises net incomes on average as well as raising the marginal wage
rate so the reform has corresponding “income” and “substitution” effects. Income
effects on labour supply are negative and WFTC implies higher incomes than FC.
So the WFTC effect on compensated labour supply is larger than that on uncom-
pensated labour supply. Moreover, if policy concern is to increase uncompensated
labour supply because the goal is to promote the “culture of work” then we are
using the wrong model. That is, if work is (at least, partly) culturally determined
then preferences are interdependent – that is, the behaviour of one individual af-
fects the behaviour of others. If this is true then this severely undermines the whole
basis of all of our evaluation methods. For example, it would undermine the ex-
perimental method because the control group would be affected by the behaviour
of the treatment group. Structural modelling would also be problematic since we
would need to define the way in which one individual affected others within a
reference group and we have no satisfactory way of defining such a group7.
A second issue is the effect of the childcare component of WFTC on both childcare
use and expenditure (which is of interest in its own right but, in any event, is
information required to cost the reform) as well as on labour supply. The literature
that considers the joint modelling of both childcare and labour supply is thin8
and examples which allow for there to be unobservables that are correlated with
both are even fewer9. Indeed, it is common to regard childcare as a constraint
on behaviour rather than a commodity that people choose although empirically
it is difficult to distinguish between the two. US research that is informative on
the issue suggests that the cross-price elasticity of the effect of childcare price on
labour supply is small and the own price effect on childcare use is large (see the
excellent survey of the childcare literature, Anderson and Levine (1999)).
Increasingly research on the effects of welfare on labour supply allows for non-
takeup by incorporating welfare stigma following on from Keane and Moffitt
(1998)10. However, whether or not takeup is an issue, there remains a third con-
ceptual difficulty – that there may be differential effects on different forms of
income on labour supply. For example, child support may regarded as unreliable
7 There is little existing research to indicate the quantitative importance of this conceptually important point. Recent
work by Neumark and Postlewaite (1998) looks at the impact of the hours of work of sisters-in-law on the labour
supply of married women and finds large effects. However, it is unclear how general this phenomenon might be.
8 See Blundell et al (2000) for a UK example.
9 See Ribar (1995) for a US example.
10 Introducing a stigma costs to participation in WFTC allows the simulation model to predict a low probability of take-
up among those with low eligibility. Something found in earlier studies of welfare programme take-up. Moreover, it
suggests a higher takeup of WFTC (in contrast to FC) for those whose eligible amount of credit has increased as a
result of the WFTC reform. In addition to stigma, compliance costs of securing the credit may be an issue.
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income and therefore labour supply may be relatively insensitive to child support
entitlements. In the context of welfate programme operation, there may be some
misperception (or even, simply, some uncertainty) about the levels of entitlement,
especially in labour market states different from the observed state – for example,
non-workers may not be aware of their Housing Benefit (or FC) entitlements when
in-work. Bingley and Walker (1996, 2000) investigate this issue in the context of
a labour supply model and find evidence of both stigma and misperceptions for
some welfare programmes11.
The fourth difficulty relates to the “incidence” of a wage subsidy. In the simulations
of the WFTC reform reported below, it is assumed that the labour market will be
unaffected by the reform. That is, we will assume that the prices of different types of
labour remain at their levels reigning under the FC. This is an important assumption
that implies that the subsidy is incident on the supply side of the labour market.
There is little previous research on the effects of wage subsidies/taxes on gross
wages12. Bingley and Lanot (1999) looks at the incidence of local income taxes
on wage rates exploiting inter and intra firm wage and labour supply variation to
show that the incidence of the tax on gross wages is approximately 50% (i.e. a half
of the tax is shifted to the employer in the form of higher wages), while Gruber
(1996) exploits a natural experiment in the Chilean social security tax to suggest
that the incidence of the tax is entirely borne by the worker and none is shifted to
the firm). It could be that the minimum wage prevents employers in imperfectly
competitive labour markets, from capturing the benefits of the WFTC programme
but it is far from clear. Moreover, since the minimum wage was imposed close to the
implementation of WFTC it may, if there is an incidence issue, be difficult to sort
out the effects of the reform arising from gross wage changes from those arising
from net wage changes. In addition, wage subsidies which vary by household
type and only apply at certain income levels will have different effects from more
general subsidies.
Fifthly, conceptually similar problems of incidence arise in the context of childcare
subsidies.
Sixth : the analysis is typically conducted excluding the self employed. It is com-
mon for data on hours of work, and even on earnings, to be censored by self-
employment. However, the self-employed are an important proportion of the la-
bour force and are disproportionately entitled to in-work transfer programmes
because of the high variance in the earnings. Estimates of takeup depend crucially
on whether the self-empolyed are included. Moreover, the analysis of their beha-
viour should incorporate the potential for their earnings to be under-recorded by
comparing their recorded income with their expenditure patterns in FES data.
11 See also Yelowitz (1995) for an example of the effects of a in-kind transfer on labour supply.
12 The issue is not even considered in Lemke et al (2000) which is otherwise a thorough investigation of the impact of
childcare subsidies in Massachussetts.
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Seventh : the effects of WFTC on the labour supply of secondary workers depend
crucially on how households are assumed to behave. If households do not pool
resources then the labour supply decisions of the secondary workers will depend
on their own incomes ignoring the impact of their behaviour on family incomes.
In this case, we might expect women married to low wage employed men to be
unaffected by FC and WFTC.
Finally, one aspect of behaviour that ought to be take into account is the inter-
actions between the welfare system and child support (CS) payments. CS counts
as income for the purposes of computing IS, FC and HB. The introduction of the
Child Support Agency and the associated CS reform was accompanied by the in-
troduction of a disregard of £15 into the FC and HB systems (but not IS). The
implementation of the proposed CS reforms have been delayed but will interact
with WFTC in important ways, not least because ALL of CS will be disregarded by
WFTC (but not by HB) so modelling will need to take into account child support
including non-compliance difficulties (see Paull et al (2000)).
Thus, the important questions for future research are :
• To what extent should policy concerned with labour supply as opposed to work
incentive (i.e. compensated labour supply) effects.
• How should the modelling take into account the possibility of cultural effects
arising from interdependent preferences ?
• Modelling childcare use and labour supply jointly allowing for a correlation
between the unobservable determinants of each.
• Estimation should allow for fixed costs, non-takeup, and differences in sensitivity
of behaviour to different forms of income.
• Modelling of labour supply should incorporate the possibility that household
members do not pool their resources.
• Similarly, modelling should allow for child support payments to interact with
WFTC.
• The labour market behaviour of the self-employed requires analysis. As an im-
portant client group for in-work welfare they deserve greater attention than they
have received to date. They are of particular interest because of their ability to
self-validate their hours.
• Capturing the incidence of wage taxation/subsidies will require that the wages
of different types of workers to be monitored closely as the wage subsidy is
imposed/extended. The interaction with the minimum wage may be important.
Moreover, if a wage subsidy increases gross wages then there will be further
labour supply implications.
• The incidence of childcare subsidies requires similar analysis and FRS, and the
DSS Baseline Childcare Survey and its follow-ups should be used to complement
WFTC evaluation data.
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5. Intertemporal Incentives
There are wider incentive issues that relate to intertemporal considerations which
deserve some consideration. There are two broad issues here. First there is the
assessment and payment period question. Secondly there are the effects that wage
subsidies have on relative wages across time – that is, on the wage now relative
to the wage in the future.
5.1. The Assessment Period
The assessment period is the length of time over which individuals have to de-
monstrate their entitlement to the programme. The shorter the assessment period
the more effective in promoting transitions from welfare to work we might expect
the programme to be. The payment period is the period over which the transfer is
payable without a further assessment being required. In FC it has been 6 months.
The longer the payment period the greater the incentive individuals have to move
into work and onto the programme. This is especially important when jobs may
last for limited periods of time : FC/WFTC will be more effective in encouraging
individuals into taking temporary or uncertain wage work if the payment period is
long since the programme acts like insurance against the risk of the wage falling
or the job ceasing to exist.
However, a long payment period and short assessment period gives rise for incen-
tives to engage in intertemporal substitution : manipulating hours of work (or the
wage) to increase entitlements to the transfer payment. Individuals could choose
the level of hours of work that maximised their entitlement to the transfer which,
after the assessment period would continue irrespective of changes in hours of
work – the recipient could choose, for example to not work at all, or to work lon-
ger hours. The literature has not considered this issue at all. The simplest example
are married mothers with employed low wage partners : here, FC between assess-
ment/reassessment periods might be regarded as lump sum transfers and the in-
come effect may then reduce the probability of participation (relative to no FC
system). However, during the assessment period there is the additional disincen-
tive associated with the lower marginal wage that arises because higher earnings in
this period reduces entitlement levels in all periods. Thus, this lower marginal wage
has a negative substitution effect that reinforces the negative income effect on the
probability of working. The FRS is suggestive : since the data records duration of
FC receipt we can isolate periods when assessment/reassessment is likely to occur.
We find that the participation rate is 28% for married women with employed part-
ners between assessments and 21% during assessment/reassessment periods and
this is consistent with our feeling that between assessment periods the negative
substitution effect is suppressed so participation is higher. The self-employed may
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also have greater potential for engaging in intertemporal substitution and they
demand attention in such research.
• Future research needs to consider the possibility that welfare programmes may
have more complex effects on behaviour than the simple static model would
suggest. Moreover, such research needs to address the question of what is the
most appropriate way of structuring programmes given the possible trade-off
between intertemporal substitution and the long term effects.
5.2. Wage Progression
Wage progression can arise for a number of reasons. Most obviously because indi-
viduals can increase their wage over time by taking a job with “prospects” (which
features some on-the-job training, learning by doing, or firm specific human capi-
tal acquisition, all of which may give the firm the incentive to offer some delayed
compensation mechanism to reduce quit rates); or because individuals can increase
their wage by investing in their own human capital outside of the job market –
through improving their health while in work or by improving their education
before ever starting work.
A wage subsidy reduces the returns to any form of future wage enhancing invest-
ment – say, through participating in some training programme. Thus, individuals
are more likely to remain on low wages, and hence require the wage subsidy to
be inclined to work, than would otherwise be the case. Thus, in-work transfer
programmes that are means tested may well encourage work, but may encourage
participation in work where the opportunities for wage progression are limited.
The most reliable evidence on wage progressions comes out of the Canadian Self
Sufficiency experiment. This data13 show that individuals who enter work because
of the in-work benefit programme tend to take lower wage jobs and do not ex-
perience much in the way of wage progression. Indeed, for all participants in this
programme there is little evidence of wage progression. Moreover, time limited
programmes are very likely to have quite different intertemporal incentive effects
(see Heckman et al (1999)) – a time limited wage subsidy is likely to increase the
incentive to invest in human capital, take a job with prospects, etc. since recipients
might realise that they will have to survive without the subsidy in due course.
This clearly has important implications for WFTC and it is important that any data
collected to evaluate the WFTC contain sufficient information on hourly wages,
preferably before, during and after spells of receipt, to be able to investigate this
issue more thoroughly. This is especially so if the programme were to be extended
to a wider population and implemented in a time limited way (just as the New Deal
for Unemployed Youths offers a temporary wage subsidy).
13 For reports on SSP, see http : //www.srdc.org/publications.htm
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• Future work needs to consider the effects of welfare programmes on wage pro-
gression incentives by investigating the types of jobs that welfare recipients take
relative to low skilled workers who are not eligible.
Finally, it is worth mentioning that with credit constraints, a wage subsidy can
allow workers to take low paid training jobs to finance the cost of training. Of
course, with a permanent wage subsidy the payoff is not clear but there may well
be some beneficial effects in this for capital constrained low income families.
6. Incentives to Parent and to Partner
Programmes that increase the return to having children (i.e. where programme
entitlement may be positively related to having children) have, at least in theory,
a positive effect on fertility behaviour. Moreover, programmes that decrease the
return to having a partner (because programme entitlement is negatively related
to partners’ earnings) have, in theory at least, a negative effect on the incentive
to partner (i.e it discourages partnership formation and encourages partnership
dissolution).
Thus, in addition to the usual work incentive issues there are a wider set of be-
havioural questions that WFTC raises and these are to do with : the incentive to
parent; and the incentive to partner. WFTC is more generous, for any given num-
ber of children, than FC and hence increases the incentive to parent because the
“return” to parenting offered by the welfare system is larger. Similarly WFTC de-
creases the incentive to partner relative to FC.
US evidence on the effects of welfare on these wider issues suggest have recently
been reviewed in Blackburn (2000)14 and Eissa and Hoynes (1999) explicitly in-
vestigates the effects of EITC on the incentive to marry15 and exploits the fact that
EITC provides positive incentives in the phase-in range and negative incentives in
the phase-out range. The evidence on marriage in Eissa and Hoynes (1999) does
suggest some statistically significant effects but the evidence in Blackburn (2000)
and the earlier review by Moffitt (1990) seems less conclusive.
The UK evidence on the effects of welfare on human capital accumulation is non-
quantitative. Such a relationship might be partly responsible for the observed
correlation between education participation and early motherhood. In BHPS data
we find that of those women who were mothers by 17, 82% left school by age
16, while those who were mothers after 20 just 56% left school at the minimum.
This correlation between human capital and teenage motherhood exacerbates the
14 See also Moffitt (1990, 1998), Ellwood (1998)
15 EITC only counts the income of married partners not unmarried ones. Thus, in the phase-in range there is an incentive
to formalise cohabiting partnerships, and the opposite in the phase out region.
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problem of welfare dependency relative to a situation where they were uncorre-
lated. The effects of the welfare system on separation, divorce and marriage have
not been the subject of extensive quantitative research : in contrast to the way in
which the correlation between early motherhood and education may contribute
to welfare dependency, the BHPS data on mothers who have ever divorced or co-
habited (the groups most “at risk” of falling into welfare) have somewhat higher
average education – divorced mothers have an average school leaving age of 16.9,
and cohabiting mothers have 17.5, compared to 16.5 for married mothers.
• Some research effort needs to be expended on modelling the effects of welfare
programmes on fertility and partnership decisions.
7. Evaluation Methods and the Results
of Some Existing Evaluations
7.1. Randomised Social Experiments
In many ways the most convincing method of evaluation is a randomised social
experiment in which there is a control (or comparison) group that is a randomised
subset of the eligible population. Such is the design of the SSP, and recent work
by Card and Robbins (1998) has used the experimental nature of this reform to
assess its effectiveness in inducing welfare recipients into work.
Of course, experiments have their own drawbacks. Firstly, they are rare and typi-
cally expensive to implement. Secondly, they are not amenable to extrapolation.
That is they cannot easily be used in the ex-ante analysis of policy reform pro-
posals. Rather, they can only be used to evaluate polices that have actually been
implemented. Thus, if they tell us that a policy has failed in some way, then the
results tell us nothing about how the world works that would allow us to infer
what may have succeeded. Finally, they require the control group to be completely
unaffected by the reform typically ruling out spillover, substitution and general
equilibrium effects on wages etc.
Nonetheless they have much to offer in enhancing our knowledge of the possible
impact of such reform. As an experimental reform the Self-Sufficiency Program
in Canada is an ideal basis for evaluating the impact of targeted in-work benefits.
The initial results from this program are thoroughly discussed and analysed in
Card and Robbins (1998).
The SSP is available to a single parent with twelve months of welfare history
and who finds a job of 30 hours a week (averaged over a month, calculated on
a monthly rolling basis). The minimum hours criterion is interesting as the UK
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system also has a minimum hours eligibility rule. SSP is a generous system and
does not change the income assistance level; so it is not, for example, causing
more individuals who do not find employment to be on lower incomes. Rather
it is giving a supplement to those who move into work. This program has been
evaluated by social experiment. This entailed following 6,000 families for 5 years
starting in 1993. One-half of the group of 6,000 eligible single parents on welfare
were offered the program and the others were not – they are the controls. The
ones that are on the program are the treatments – and we can compare those two
groups.
Figure 7 : The Canadian SSP Programme
Figure 7 shows a typical budget constraint for a Canadian welfare recipient. The
broken line gives the budget set that an individual, not on SSP, would face if they
were earning the minimum wage in British Columbia, which was $6 an hour in
1993. Taking a job at a few hours a week exploits an earnings disregard, thereafter
all earned income is effectively lost in a dollar-for-dollar transfer back to the
income assistance program. So, until income assistance is exhausted – that is
working nearly 50 hours a week – they would get no return, with an implicit tax
rate of 100% on their earnings. The solid line shows the effects of SSP.
SSP is a very well designed social experiment. The control and the treatment groups
look very similar before the experiment takes place. That means that effectively
the controls are really quite a good match for the treatment group. There is almost
a doubling in employment for the treatment group. This is displayed in Figure
8, the left hand side of which shows the close relationship between employment
rates across the control and treatment group before the experiment began, while
the right hand side shows how these grow apart as the SSP treatment group enters
work earlier than the controls.
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Figure 8 : Typical SSP Findings
Card and Robbins (1998) report many such results. The impact on hours and em-
ployment is very similar. These are low hour working individuals. The criterion is
that they work at least one week of the month for 30 hours. The treatment group
increased its hours of work, more or less, twofold relative to the control group. So
it is having quite a large effect on the hours of work chosen by these individuals.
Although this is a very specific target group and a program with many individual
idiosyncrasies, these are all single parents on welfare and it may be considered
somewhat of a surprise that there is such an effect of financial incentives for those
individuals. This type of quasi-experimental evidence certainly suggests that in-
work benefits can have quite significant effects on labour market behaviour even
among lone parents – one of the central target groups for the UK and US reforms.
7.2. Natural Experiments
Another popular method of evaluation is the natural experiment approach. This
considers the reform itself as an experiment and tries to find naturally occur-
ring comparison groups that can mimic the properties of the control group in
the properly designed experimental context. This method is also often labelled
“difference-in-differences” since it is usually implemented by comparing the dif-
ference in average behaviour before and after the reform for the eligible group with
the before and after contrast for the comparison group. In the absence of a ran-
domised experiment, this approach can be seen to recover the average treatment
effect on the treated by removing unobservable individual effects and common
macro effects.
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7.2.1. EITC
The impact of the EITC reforms in the US, which have been very influential in
shaping recent reforms in the UK, have been studied extensively by this method.
In particular, the important studies by Eissa and Liebman (1996) and Eissa and
Hoynes (1998) purport to show important impacts of the reforms on the labour
market.
The EITC began in 1975 as a modest program aimed at offsetting the social secu-
rity payroll tax for low-income families with children.16 After major expansions
in 1986, 1990 and 1993, federal spending on the EITC (including both tax expen-
ditures and outlays) is projected to be 1.7 times as large as federal spending on
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) in 1996.
A taxpayer’s eligibility for the EITC depends on the taxpayer’s earned income
(or in some cases adjusted gross income), and the number of qualifying children
who meet certain age, relationship and residency tests. First, the taxpayer must
have positive earned income, defined as wage and salary income, business self-
employment and earned income below a specified amount (in 1996, maximum
allowable income for a taxpayer with two or more children was $28,495). Second, a
taxpayer must have a qualifying child, who must be under age 19.17 The amount of
the credit to which a taxpayer is entitled depends on the taxpayer’s earned income,
adjusted gross income and, since 1991, the number of EITC-eligible children in the
household. There are three regions in the credit schedule. These are presented in
Figure 9 which provides a description of the EITC in 1993 and 1996.
Figure 9 : The 1993 EITC Expansion for 1 and 2 Children
16 The discussion in this section draws heavily on the excellent review by Eissa and Hoynes (1998) where further details
can be found.
17 See Eissa and Liebman (1996) for a more extensive discussion of EITC rules.
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The initial phase-in region transfers an amount equal to the subsidy rate times
their earnings. In the flat region, the family receives the maximum credit. In the
phase-out region, the credit is phased out at some given benefit reduction rate.
In 1993, a family with two or more children could receive a maximum credit of
$1, 511, $777 more than a family with one child. The post-1993 expansion of the
EITC, phased in between 1994 and 1996, led to an increase in the subsidy rate from
19.5 percent to 40 percent (18.5 to 34 percent) and an increase in the maximum
credit from $1, 511 to $3, 556 ($1, 434 to $2, 152) for taxpayers with two or more
children (taxpayers with one child). This expansion was substantially larger for
those with two or more children. The phase-out rate was also raised, from 14
percent to 21 percent for taxpayers with two or more children (13 to 16 percent
for taxpayers with one child). Overall, the range of the phase-out was expanded
dramatically, such that by 1996 a couple with two children would still be eligible
with income levels of almost $30,000.
These policy reforms are useful in providing a “before and after” assessment of
their effectiveness in changing labour market behaviour. The idea of this “natural
experiment” or “difference-in-differences” approach is to formalise this before and
after contrast by finding a comparison group, not affected by the reform, which
is likely to have shared a similar macro environment. This approach removes any
common time effects in participation across the groups. Consequently it strips
out the effect of any common macro shocks that would otherwise be spuriously
attributed to the reform.
It does, however, rest on strong assumptions and, again, cannot easily be used
to extrapolate from on implemented policy to another proposed policy. The two
most important assumptions18 are : common time effects across the target and
comparison groups; and no composition changes within each group over time.
Choosing a comparison group that satisfies these two assumptions is difficult. In
their evaluation of the EITC policy reforms in the US, Eissa and Liebman (1996)
consider two contrasts from the repeated cross sections of the Current Population
Survey data. For the impact of the reform on single mothers, either the whole
group of single women with children are used with single women without children
as controls, or the group of low education single with children are used with the
low education single women without children as controls.
The former control group can be criticised for not capturing the common macro
effects. In particular, this control group is already working to a very high level
of participation in the US labour market (around 95%) and therefore cannot be
expected to increase its level of participation in response to the economy coming
out of a recession. In this case all the expansion in labour market participation in
the group of single women with children will be attributed to the reform itself. The
later group is therefore more appropriate as it targets better those single parents
18 See Blundell, Duncan and Meghir (1998) for the precise derivation of these conditions.
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who are likely to be eligible to EITC and the control group has a participation rate
of about 70%. With these caveats in mind, there remain some relatively strong
results on participation effects that come from the Eissa and Liebman study. For
single parents there is evidence of a reasonable movement in to work. An idea of
the size can be had from inspection Figure 10, from Leibman (1999), which shows
how the relative participation rates of the target (single mother) and comparison
(single women with no children) groups have changed and the EITC maximum (a
measure of the overall generosity of the treatment.
Figure 10 : EITC and Labour Force Participation
There is also some evidence of negative effect on hours for those in work but this
is rather small. In subsequent work, Eissa and Hoynes (NBER WP 1998) estimate
that 63% of the increase in employment of single mothers from 1984 to 1996 was
due to the EITC expansion.
A more recent study, Eissa and Hoynes (1998), has considered the impact on mar-
ried couples and find some evidence of negative “income” effect reducing the
labour supply of married women. This is precisely the adverse effect that can be
expected when a work contingent tax credit is based on a family income and will
also be found in evaluations of the likely impact of the WFTC in the UK.
These studies of the EITC reforms in the US therefore point to a reasonably strong
positive effect on participation of single parents with offsetting effects on the
labour supply of married women.
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7.2.2. Family Credit
FC was introduced in 1988 to replace Family Income Supplement (FIS) and shares
some of the central features of the EITC in the US. It was designed to provide
support for low wage families with children. An unusual feature of the Family
Credit system is the minimum weekly hours eligibility criterion. A family with
children needs to have one adult working 16 hours or more per week to qualify for
FC. At its introduction this was set at 24 hours but then reduced to 16 in April 1992
to encourage part-time work by lone parents with young children. To partially
offset any adverse incentive effects for full time work, a further supplementary
credit at 30 hours per week was introduced in April 1995. These Family Credit
reforms are interesting in their own right, but we will be particularly interested in
them as a basis for evaluating the reliability of assessment of the impact of the
WFTC proposals.
In the FC system each eligible family is paid a credit up to a maximum amount
which depends on the number of children. There is also a smaller addition if they
work 30 hours or more. Eligibility depends on family net income being lower
than some threshold (£79.00 per week in 1998-99). As incomes rise the credit is
withdrawn at a rate of 70%. In 1996 average payments were around £57 a week
and take-up rates stand at 69% of eligible individuals and 82% of the potential
expenditure.
The 16-hour reform took place in 1992. To examine the behaviour of hours and
participation before and after this reform we use the Family Expenditure Survey
data source, a cross section survey of some 7000 British households per year. The
data has been re-organised according to fiscal years to coincide with the reforms
to the Family Credit system. The larger FRS data source, covering some 50,000
British households, which is used for the ex-ante evaluation of the WFTC reform
below is only available for the 1994-1997 period and so is not useful in studying
the impact of the 1992 budget reform. Both data sources collect sufficient income
and earnings information to accurately trace out the budget constraint facing
individual families.
The 1992 reform to Family Credit moved the hours eligibility rule from 24 hours
per week to 16. A picture of the hours changes before and after the 1992 reform
is presented in Figure 11. This figure relates to a lower educated sample of lone
mothers from the Family Expenditure Survey. The first histogram gives the dis-
tribution of hours of work for the fiscal year 1991 – before the reform. Notice
that for single parents the spike at 24 hours tends to disappear and a spike at 16
hours becomes more pronounced. In Blundell, Duncan, McCrea and Meghir (1999)
a similar analysis is provided for participation where there is a notable increase
in the relative employment of lower education women with children after the re-
form. The results suggest a 10% increase in employment from the 1992 reform.
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Figure 11 : Weekly Hours of Work and the 16 Hour Reform to Family Credit :
Single Parent, Lower Education. UK FES
But they also point to a lower average hours worked among those eligible women
in employment.
The analysis of the 1992 reforms therefore gives some support for positive employ-
ment effects and lower average hours worked resulting from such in-work benefit
reforms.
These expansions of FC occurred from 1988 and may well have affected participa-
tion of clients. We would hope to reveal this by comparing participation rates for
young (i.e. below 40) low educated (i.e. left education at the minimum age) mo-
thers with low educated young single women without children. Figure 12 below
indicates that while FC expanded, the proportion on young single low-educated
mothers rose slightly but the proportion of young single women without children
(the control group) fell. The graph could be interpreted as showing how FC helped
single parents to remain in work as the economy went in to recession. Of course,
the UK case is more complex than the US one illustrated in Figure 11 since, al-
though IS and HB parameters were indexed, there was a dramatic rise in housing
costs at this time and this will be reflected in the out-of-work welfare entitlements
(through the housing costs element of IS) to a greater extent that in the in-work
welfare entitlements (through HB). Thus a rise in housing costs will reduce work
incentives in the welfare UK system and this may well have offset the effects of
the FC expansions that occurred at this time.
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Figure 12 : Women and Employment in Britain : Low Education Group
Thus, while comparisons over time are helpful they need more interpretation that
is the case in the US. The FES data could be used to conduct an exercise like that
in Meyer and Rosenblaum (1998) that attempts to isolate the effects of each aspect
of the welfare system on the behaviour of single mothers in the US CPS data.
However FES is rather too small for this kind of exercise.
Further support for financial incentive effects on employment and hours worked
can be seen from the 1995 reform. This second reform to Family Credit added a
further small credit at 30 hours. The larger FRS sample can be used to analyse
hours of work before and after this reform and in Figure 13 the hours of work
among lower educated working single parents is presented for each of the four
financial years available in the FRS. Notice the pronounced spike in the hours
distribution at 16 hours for single parents and the pronounced spike at 30 hours,
something that is not apparent in other groups.
7.3. Ex-Ante Evaluation and Structural Models
Reforms to Family Credit in the UK provide some basis for ex-post evaluation
of in-work benefit reform in the UK and below some evidence is presented on
labour supply responses in the UK using these past reforms. However, to evaluate
new reform proposals such as the WFTC in the UK, requires an ex-ante evaluation.
Although we can draw on the quasi-experimental and natural experiment findings,
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Figure 13 : Weekly Hours Worked and the 30 hour reform to Family Credit : Single
Parents, Low education. FRS
the evaluation the WFTC reform requires a structural model of the counterfactual
that allows us to simulate the choices of individuals as their earnings opportunities
in work change. For this we draw on the recent WFTC evaluation study by Blundell,
Duncan, McCrae and Meghir (2000) as well as structural modelling of labour market
behaviour that is available in the wider literature – such as Preston and Walker
(1999) which has been used for simulating WFTC effects in Paull et al (2000). Such
an approach develops a statistical simulation model of labour supply behaviour
based on individual survey data and incorporates a complete description of budget
constraints (and, in the case of Blundell et al (2000), childcare availability). To do
this requires an accurate description of the budget constraint for each individual
whether they currently work or not. In turn this requires an assessment of their
likely market wage for individuals who may now enter work.19
However, once the programme has been in place for some time the natural experi-
ment method could be applied using data that records the behaviour of individuals
before and after the reform to assess the robustness of the ex-ante approaches.
19 Gregg, Johnson and Reed (1999) consider a number of alternative methods for “imputing” the wage for new entrants.
Their preferred method is to use the wages of recent entrants in the UK Labour Force Survey. As one might expect,
these are often quite below the wages of similar individuals in work, and suggest that the use of wages of workers
without correction could lead to a biased assessment of a policy reform. However, for lone parents at least, they report
little difference between entry wages and the average of wages for all those in work. The standard reform simulation
approach, as used in the figures reported in section 4 below, uses wages adjusted for selection. These will also typically
be lower than the observed wages for those currently in work (see Blundell, Duncan, McCrea and Meghir (2000)).
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• Since experimental and structural methods each have their drawbacks it will
be important for future research to pursue both approaches and to explore any
differences in results.
7.4. Some Existing UK Evaluation Studies
There are several attempts at modelling labour supply that have ether been directly
designed with the evaluation of UK in-work transfer programmes or have particular
relevance for it. We briefly review what these studies have to say and attempt
to isolate what might be the most important features of a more comprehensive
evaluation of WFTC. Thus, below, we explain the modelling that has been done on
the impact of the UK welfare system on work incentives.
7.4.1. The Gregg, Johnson and Reed study (IFS 1999)
This work exploits the panel element of the Quarterly Labour Force Survey (QLFS)
of 1994/5 to explain who moves into work as a function of the expected gains from
work and the level of out of-work income. Thus, rather than explain labour force
status, their model explains a particular transition from one status to another. The
work depends on being able to model the wage that individuals might reasonably
expect to earn, from which FC entitlements can then be calculated, and the resul-
ting expected in-work income can then be compared with observed out-of-work
income. The authors then estimate the relationship between the probability of an
individual making the transition to work and the gains from working, which they
find to be significantly positive. To compute the effect of WFTC on the level of
employment one needs both estimates of the effect of the gains from work on the
flow into work but also some assumption about the flow out of work. The most
reasonable assumption is that the outflow “rate” (i.e. the proportion of the stock
of employees that leaves employment in any year) is constant and this is used
in the results reported in Blundell and Reed (2000)20. The estimates imply that
the net effect of WFTC on participation of lone mothers is an increase of 1.9%;
for married mothers with employed partner participation is predicted to fall by
0.8%; for married mothers with unemployed partner participation is predicted to
rise by 1.8%; and for married fathers with non-employed partner, participation is
predicted to rise by 0.5%.
7.4.2. The Bingley and Walker study (1997)
This paper, following earlier work (Bingley et al (1995)), used a random utility
model (see Hausman and Wise (1977)) whereby the probability of choosing a par-
20 See http : //www.ifs.org.uk/research/labour/wftc bn.pdf.
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ticular labour market state (say, part-time work) depended on the differences in
income levels between this choice and other available choices. The essence of the
discrete choice methodology is that individuals are assumed to choose between
one of a finite number of possible labour market states. The simplest UK example
of this kind of work is Bingley, Lanot, Symons and Walker (1994) which was con-
cerned with the behaviour of lone mothers in the UK and how their labour market
behaviour responded to its determinants and was used to simulate the impact of
child support reform.
The gross income levels are used to compute the net income corresponding to each
state via a tax-benefit routine. Take-up can be treated as an endogenous variable
in this analysis : the probability of take-up can be allowed to depend on the level
of entitlement and other variables that also determine hours of work, and one
can allow for a correlation between the unobservable determinants of take-up and
hours.
Figure 14 : The Effect of the FC Maximum on the Probabilities of being in Each
Labour Market State
The results in Bingley and Walker (1997) were applied directly to the problem of
FC design to show how variations in the FC maximum affects work incentives and
government revenue. The modelling distinguished between two “part-time” states
– PT(0) which was 16 hours and PT(1) which was 30 hours. Figure 14 quantifies
precisely to what extent each state is affected by simulating for every individual in
a large sample of lone mothers drawn from the pooled FES data : non-participation
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falls by 4% points as the maximum varies from zero (i.e. no FC system) to reigning
level (an MFC of approximately £80 pw), and then falls by a further 12% points
as the MFC is doubled the sample’s actual maximum. The FT probability rises
correspondingly fast.
Figure 15 : The Effect of the FC Maximum on the FC Expenditure and (Minus)
Government Revenue
Figure 15 shows the effects of this hypothetical “experiment” on FC programme ex-
penditure and on total government revenue (tax and NI minus welfare programmes
expenditures (IS, HB and FC)) for this sample. Notice that FC expenditure increases
monotonically with the generosity of the maximum. However, total government
revenue rises to a maximum at an MFC of about £20 per week, because of the
reduced IS expenditure, and then falls. Thus a modest FC programme would be
self-financing according to these estimates.
Subsequent work using this methodology attempted to estimate separate effects
for HB, IS, FC and earned incomes in Bingley and Walker (2000). In that paper the
estimated effect of HB variation on labour market status was estimated to be not
significantly different from zero, while the effect of earned income variation was
large. FC and IS effects were somewhere in-between.
The results of this line of research suggest that :
• It may be important to accommodate imperfect take-up and imperfect percep-
tions of transfers in the modelling of the effectiveness of programmes.
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7.4.3. The Preston and Walker (1999) and Paull et al (2000) studies
Preston and Walker (1999) adopts an explicit functional form for labour supply
“preferences” rather than simply assuming that the probability is some arbitrary
function of income differences between states. The form used was that correspon-
ding to a labour supply model where hours of work are assumed to be a linear
function of both the wage rate and the level of unearned income. The modelling
was simple and did not incorporate important complications such as fixed costs
of work, childcare costs, and non-takeup.
The estimates, obtained using data on FES lone mothers, implied that the indiffe-
rence curves were as illustrated in Figure 16. Those for mothers with school aged
children are both shallow and have little curvature which implies that the effect
of changes in wages have large effects on behaviour. For example, the median
mother with a young child would be indifferent between not working and wor-
king full-time with approximately an additional £280 per week, while the median
mother with a secondary school aged child would only require approximately an
additional £100 to be so indifferent. The wage and income effects behind these
estimates were significant and somewhat larger than the typical UK estimates, re-
flecting the assumptions of no fixed costs and no childcare. Nevertheless these
simple estimates are useful for predicting the effects of reforms although they are
likely to be more optimistic than more typical estimates would imply.
Figure 16 : Estimated Indifference Curves
Paull et al (2000) use these estimates to simulate the effects of proposed child
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support reforms using FRS 1997 data. Since these reforms would be implemented
after the advent of WFTC the paper also simulated the effect of WFTC. The results
of this exercise depend on what is being assumed about the take-up probability of
FC and the compliance rate for child support payments but a typical result would
have the pre-reform, i.e. FC, (post-reform, i.e. WFTC,) estimated probabilities of
non-participation, part-time work and full-time work as 58.5% (55.4%), 15.3%
(20.7%) and 26.2% (24.9%) respectively. Thus, the model implies that WFTC would
lead to a 3.1% expansion in participation for lone mothers - which is close to
the predicted increase from the more complex modelling in Blundell et al (2000)
outlined below.
Despite the naïve assumptions, the Preston/Walker model is helpful in illustrating
the issues that would still arise in any more complicated WFTC evaluation research.
In Figure 17 we show the effect of changing the size of the WFTC taper from zero
(where WFTC would simply be a lump-sum transfer to anyone working at least
16 hours) to 100% (where WFTC would imply a “spike” at 16 hours). The level
of entitlement at 16 hours is left unchanged in this scenario and this effectively
means that the participation rate remains unchanged – all this experiment does is
change the full-time/part-time composition of participants. This is an important
design point : the taper only affects the composition of participants and not the
level of participation (except if there are significant fixed costs of work when the
lower taper may tempt some to start to work).
Figure 17 : Changes in the Taper
This experiment also raises the question of whether we want to include the “income
effect” into our consideration of the labour supply effects as well as the pure wage
(or “substitution”) effect. When the taper is zero, WFTC simply has income effects
on behaviour that imply lower hours of work (i.e. a greater part-time rate) than
without WFTC. But as the taper rises this reduction in labour supply due to the
income effect is reinforced by the adverse effect of a lower marginal wage from
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the higher taper. Thus the part-time (full-time) rate should rise (fall) as the taper
rises.
The distinction between income and substitution effects is an important one since
empirically reforms can have very different effects when income effects are igno-
red. For example, Figure 18 shows the effects of the taper on labour supply (i.e the
part-time and full-time participation rates) as in the earlier figures, as the dashed
lines, together with the effects on “compensated” labour supply where we strip out
the income effect. That is, we calculate the money gain (or loss) for each indivi-
dual and then hypothetically take away (give them back) that sum to leave just
the effect of the reform on behaviour that works through marginal wages.
Figure 18 : Compensated and Uncompensated Labour Supply Effects of the WFTC
Phase-Out Taper
Just as we can use the analysis to simulate the effects of hypothetical reforms
we can also use them to simulate the effects of actual reforms. For example,
the introduction of the £10 FC bonus for working 30+ hours would, with these
estimates, imply that the percentage of lone mothers working 30+ hours would
rise from 18% to 25%. Similarly, the reduction in the 24 hours rule to 16 hours
implies that the percentage of lone mothers predicted to work rises from 43% to
63% but there would be large reductions in the hours of work of the workers so
that average hours, over the whole sample, fall from average of 15.6 to 14.3. Of
course 16 may not be the only possible choice and we can simulate the effect of
other possibilities.
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7.4.4. The Blundell et al (2000) Study
This study uses a discrete choice structural approach to allow the simulation of the
WFTC reforms in the UK. In estimation and simulation, lone parents and couples
with children are treated separately. This is to reflect that they may have different
preferences and may face different market opportunities and childcare options.
However, the underlying form of the models used across both groups is similar.
Both allow for quite flexible preferences over hours of work and net incomes. Both
account for fixed costs of work and both allow childcare costs to vary with hours
of work and to differ by the age and number of children. An important feature
of the models used is that they allow preference heterogeneity across household
types. That is, preferences and costs are allowed to vary with observable factors
such as age and demographic composition. Moreover, they are also allowed to
depend on unobservable characteristics.
These unobservable terms generate a distribution of outcomes for each observa-
tion (household) in the data. Each observation represents the population with the
equivalent observable characteristics. The distribution of outcomes then implies
a probability that a person of such an observed type will participate or work a
certain number of hours. This probability should be interpreted as the proportion
of people in the population with these characteristics that carry out the action
being evaluated (e.g. participation in the labour market). Simulating the effects of
the reform involves estimating the changes in these probabilities (proportions) as
a result of the policy being introduced.
For each working individual from the sample of lone parents, and for each pair of
working adults in the sample of couples with children, the FRS data together with
the IFS TAXBEN model allows a net income figure to be calculated for each hours
of work point. For non-workers additional information on their hourly wage rate is
required to complete the net income calculations. These hourly wages are calculated
from the predictions of a log hourly wage regression. This regression includes
education, age, demographic and regional dummy variables and is estimated using
the FRS data.
Thus, for each individual in our sample the net income that would be associated
with any choice of hours of work can be predicted. Given the budget constraint
facing each individual, the approach taken is to describe choices over a number
of possible labour market states. For couples, the model is extended to allow two
hours dimensions – for the husband and for the mother. However, male hours of
work are simply allowed to be at full-time or zero, reflecting the very low incidence
of part-time work for men in couple households with children.
The model is a variation on the multinomial discrete choice preference model but
is not sufficient to adequately describe the observed outcomes in the data. For that
two additional features are required : a model of childcare costs and usage, and
a model of additional fixed costs of work. To account for childcare the informa-
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tion on childcare costs presented earlier was used. In particular, for each type of
childcare used for the two groups the hourly cost is taken as given. Then the rela-
tionship between hourly childcare costs and various demographic characteristics
was estimated so as to associate with each household type a probability of choo-
sing the relevant type of childcare. A regression relationship between the amount
of childcare used and the level of hours worked was also estimated. Hence for each
possible hours choice and each household type the probability of using each type
of childcare and the amount of care could be predicted. This formed an input into
the construction of the likelihood function of the data for estimating the unknown
preference parameters.
Specifically, even though there are a number of childcare types available, no at-
tempt to model the choice between types of childcare was made, and the model
was run for each type of childcare. Then the weighted average of the relevant
outcomes using the calculated probabilities was taken.
Finally it is important to emphasise that the method allowed for childcare use even
when not working. This is an important feature of the data and not taking it into
account could seriously distort the estimated incentives.
Fixed costs are the costs that an individual has to pay to get to work. For many
families they are made up in part by the childcare costs already covered above.
In particular in our model childcare induces both fixed and variable costs that
effectively act as a marginal tax rate. However, there are additional costs, e.g.
transport, which will vary by household type and by region. These are modelled as
a once off weekly cost. In the model they are subtracted directly from net income
for any choices that involve work. They are modelled in a similar way to prefe-
rences, in terms of a set of observable factors and an unobservable heterogeneity
variable. These terms will now enter the utility comparisons for each individual
in their work/non-work choice. Consequently, they will also enter the probability
terms described above. To calculate the probability of any observed hours point,
the heterogeneity term in the fixed costs equation is integrated out in estimation
along with the heterogeneity in preferences, and the parameters of the observable
variables that determine fixed costs adds to the list of parameters to be estimated.
For couples there are, in principle, two such fixed costs. However, in estimation
we can only really identify the fixed costs of the secondary earner, since for the
primary (typically male) earner the data suggest only two labour market states
(full-time work at around 37-40 hours or 0 hours).
Table 5 reports a summary of the simulation results for single parent households;
women with employed partners; and women with unemployed partners, and the
impact on male employment. Overall the effects on participation across the two
groups of men roughly cancel out each other leaving the major impact operating
through the effects on women, mainly single parents. However, if we consider
the impact on workerless households alone, then such offsetting effects cover up
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important effects and the impact on men and women in couples where neither is
working is much more substantial.
Table 5 : WFTC Simulation Results : Summary Table
Group Number %
Single Parents 34, 000 2.20
Married Women (Partner not working) 11, 000 1.32
Married Women (Partner working) −20, 000 −0.57
Married men, partner not working 13, 000 0.37
Married men, partner working −10, 500 0.30
Total Effect 27, 500
Decrease in Workerless Families 57, 000
Source : Blundell, Duncan, Meghir and McCrae (2000)
8. Disability andWork Incentives
The existing research on work incentives and the disabled is almost exclusively
US. Only Madden and Walker (1998) estimate a labour supply model for the UK
that incorporates both the impact of disability on (own) labour supply but also the
impact on the caring and labour supply of others. This finds that own ill health has
a negative effect on wages for men but not women; being a carer has a negative
effect on wages for women but not men; and that unobservables associated with
caring are positively correlated with wages for men but not for women. It also
finds that own ill health has a strong negative effect on the labour supply of both
men and women and a negative effect on their supply of caring; and that hours
caring are responsive to wages for women.
The way in which welfare programmes enter this complex set of decisions is not
modelled but Haveman et al (1991) provide some US evidence which suggests that
(out-of-work) welfare transfers that relate to the disabled have a significant work
disincentive effect. In the UK, the Disability Workers Allowance is a programme that
ran parallel to Family Credit with similar work requirements. However the take-up
rate was very low and the move to Disabled Workers Tax Credit (the equivalent
to WFTC) may well promote takeup. The difficulty in modelling the impact of
this is twofold : the small sample sizes involved and the potential relation between
disability and unobservables that affect hours of work and affect wages. This is
especially acute using self-reported disability as in the FRS data. However the 1997
FRS had a follow-up of the disabled that contains detailed information about the
nature of the disability. We would suggest, to complement qualitative research,
that :
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• Further research be conducted, especially using FRS and the disability follow-up,
on the relationship between welfare, disability, work and care.
9. New Research Possibilities and
the Case for Extending SOLIF
WFTC raises a long list of varied research questions that are explained above. Most
of the questions are inherently quantitative ones – what matters for policy is how
large an effect is and to what extent correlations in the real world imply causation.
Answering these questions will inevitably rely heavily on the statistical analysis
of large survey datasets.
Existing data is useful for many of the questions raised : especially LFS, FRS and
FES, partly because they cover a history of events from which one might hope
to isolate natural experiments that illuminate current policy concerns. However,
being able to monitor the effects of a policy on a particular group of people over
time has some considerable advantages and DSS and IR are collecting new data
that will allow researchers to do this.
This “SOLIF” data is a sample of approximately 5000 households selected so that it
contains households that are likely to be eligible for Family Credit and subsequently
for WFTC – the wave 1 income limit was set at 35% above the point where FC
eligibility is exhausted. It is planned to develop SOLIF into a 3-wave panel. While
the aim of the work is to evaluate the effectiveness of in-work transfers on work
incentives, SOLIF is useful for many of the much broader set of questions that are
relevant to the wider policy issues.
Wave 1 contains FRS-like data on income and hours, travel to work costs, and
some childcare data. Hours and income data is recorded for the self-employed.
There are some limitations in the data. In wave 1 the childcare data is censored
by employment in the last two years, and while it contains extensive and helpful
information about the childcare type, reliability, alternatives and expenditure, an
important deficiency is that it does not contain information on hours of care or
the prices of care by type – although Wave 2 will go some way towards rectifying
this.
There is some fertility and partnership history, some job tenure/history data, and
some absent father information but not enough to compute interaction with the
child support system.
SOLIF contains education years and education qualifications and some training
data. The data on welfare includes FC spell length, repeated spells since 1996,
awareness/perception of FC/WFTC and their interaction with other welfare pro-
grammes. The way in which FC is paid, and to who it is paid, is recorded and
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comparing this with how WFTC is paid and to who, and how these relate to work
hours, will be invaluable in uncovering the extent to which households pool their
resources and hence in revealing how labour supply should be modelled.
There is limited information that could be used to address child outcomes associated
with variation in parental income. There is some child health data and there is
some information about how the main respondent feels about hardship and its
affect on the children, but this is not asked of both parents. This later omission
might be important since differential attitudes to how the children are affected
by household resources it might have provided some evidence about the extent of
intra-household altruism that determines the extent to which resources are pooled.
The timing of WFTC relative to New Deals and the minimum wage imply that it
may be difficult to unravel wage progression in the current job from minimum
wage effects, but respondents are asked if they think that their wages were affected
by the minimum.
SOLIF can be used in two ways : to provide before and after comparison when a
second wave is available; and as data, even as just a single wave, for the struc-
tural modelling of behaviour. Both uses are important since each method has its
drawbacks. The immediate agenda for SOLIF Wave 1 should therefore be to :
• Check it against other sources (especially FRS and LFS) to establish the extent
to which it suffers from non-random response problems – however, FRS/LFS for
1999/2000 will not be available until some time after SOLIF 1 become available
for analysis. It will be especially important to compare the childcare data with
the DfEE Baseline Survey and FRS childcare data.
• Develop the methodology to overcome the endogenous sampling that was used
to construct SOLIF – that is, observations were selected according to earnings,
which itself is affected by labour supply decisions; Estimate labour supply, takeup
and childcare models following Blundell et al (2000).
• Construct a TAXBEN for the data to allow the modelling of take-up and labour
supply.
• Take-up should be checked against FRS, and some modelling of its relationship
with client characteristics and level of entitlement; Joint modelling of who FC is
paid to, conditional on takeup, should be undertaken.
• Model hardship variables as a function of FC income and its allocation and
other sources of income, allowing for endogenous allocation of FC. Evaluate the
importance of FC paid to fathers relative to mothers (and relative to other forms
of income) for reducing hardship. Model child health similarly.
• Detailed analysis of the self-employed who, in FRS, appear to have large entit-
lements but have low apparent take-up rates – perhaps misleadingly so because
their incomes are under-recorded.
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• Investigate the impact of FC on recent wage growth (SOLIF has some recall wage
data as well as current wage information), controlling for a minimum wage
effect.
• SOLIF fertility and partnership formation should be compared to non-WFTC
eligibles (in FRS and/or BHPS). Similarly child health should be compared.
When Wave 2 becomes available there are further research issues that can be
addressed :
• Comparisons of actual wave 2 behaviour with wave 1 structural model predic-
tions.
• Comparisions of wave 2 behaviour and wave 1 behaviour by FC and WFTC
entitlement and takeup conditional on entitlement.
• Comparisons of wave 2 behaviour, hardship and child health with wave 1 by
allocation of FC and WFTC.
• Analysis of the allocation of WFTC relative to FC and its relationship to behaviour
and hardship.
• Comparisons of childcare costs and wage rates by FC and WFTC entitlement and
takeup conditional on entitlement.
In all of these cases attention will need to be given to controlling for : the effects of
children ageing, a changing labour market, non-random attrition (for example, it
will be important to follow-up those that become too rich to be in Wave 1 SOLIF).
A third wave would permit further extension of analysis, with data becoming
available for two years of WFTC.
In addition to these issues that SOLIF seems reasonably well adapted to address
the extensive agenda outlined throughout earlier sections that required further
analysis of FRS and other datasets. It will be important that quantitative research
proceeds on both fronts since there are trade-offs involved.
In the long-run there will be considerable benefits to following up SOLIF parti-
cipants so as to be able to compare the effectiveness of parental cash via WFTC
as a way of dealing with poor child outcomes with direct interventions through
SureStart treatments. Thus, attention should be given to either merging external
sources of information such as medical histories and educational outcomes or col-
lecting this through subsequent follow-up surveys. Similarly, long term outcomes
for the parents will require either that administrative records be merged of, say,
NICs to look at employment and earnings or follow-up surveys be conducted. In
addition where child support is an issue, merging information about the absent
parent’s circumstances would add considerably to the richness of the analysis that
could be supported.
n°11 - 2002 / 2
122
Working Families’ Tax Credit A Review of the Evidence, Issues and Prospects for Further Research
10. Summary and Recommendations
This review has considered some of the research issues surrounding measuring
the impact of in-work benefit reforms. Such programs are designed to target in-
come to relatively poor families that suffer from low returns to work. The evidence
from existing reforms across a number of countries suggests that a careful design
of these programs can significantly increase the incomes of low-income families
while providing reasonable incentives for parents to work. The paper has conside-
red evaluations from the quasi-experiments in Canada, from the before and after
analysis of past reforms to the EITC in the US and to the FC in the UK. All these
different pieces of evidence tend to support this general conclusion. This evidence
also points to the important characteristics of the design of any data set that is
being developed to evaluate in-work benefit programmes.
Section 10 has summarised the main implications of this review for the extension
of existing UK data sources and development of new evaluation studies. We have
argued that since these programs are generally based on family income, a careful
analysis of the different sources of family income and how they are effected by the
receipt of in-work benefit income is essential in modelling incentives correctly. This
not only relates to labour supply incentives but is also critical to our understanding
of a wider set of incentive questions. For example, means testing against family
income will generally imply that the incentive to parent is increased and the
incentive to partner is decreased. WFTC exacerbates this relative to FC since it
enhances both the payments for children and reduces the penalty of family income
(the phase-out taper). The very nature of the decision-making within the household
is critical. If households fail to pool their resources then the effects of welfare
programmes that are means tested against family income are likely to be different
than would be the case if pooling did occur.
One further area in which we should have more to say but for which there is little
rigorous existing information concerns the longer run pay-off to labour market
attachment for individuals of the type eligible for the WFTC. One might hope that
through the progression of wages and general increases in employability associated
with longer job tenure, workers move themselves out of the low-income group
and onto a reasonable earnings level, and are then less likely to be dependent
on any form of welfare including tax credits. However, if this dynamic pay-off is
relatively low, then these individuals are likely to remain on these credits. Indeed,
the incentives for training and human capital investment for low skilled workers
are likely to be reduced by in-work benefits. Thus an important dynamic trade-off
is inherent, over and above any static equity-efficiency trade-off. Providing the
measurements necessary for the evaluation of this dynamic trade-off will form an
important element of any future research on the impact of in-work benefits like
the WFTC and reforms to them.
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